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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT- INDIGENT CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS -RIGHT TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL- MISDEMEANORS -The
United States Supreme Court has held that the sixth and fourteenth
amendments do not require a state to provide counsel for an indigent
defendant charged with a crime for which imprisonment upon convic-
tion is authorized but not imposed.
Scott v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979).
On January 31, 1972, Aubrey Scott, an indigent,' appeared pro se
before an Illinois trial court on a charge of theft for shoplifting.' The
applicable Illinois statute8 provided for a maximum penalty of a $500
fine or one year in jail, or both. The court proceeding began as a
preliminary hearing, but when Scott indicated to the court that he was
then ready for trial, the court ordered him arraigned and he pleaded not
guilty. Although Scott was advised of his right to a jury trial, he con-
sented to a bench trial. His immediate trial resulted in conviction and a
sentence to pay a $50 fine. At no time during the entire proceeding
was Scott advised of a right to be represented by counsel, and to have
counsel appointed if he was indigent.'
1. The question of Scott's indigence was not raised during the trial court proceed-
ing. After conviction, his status as an indigent was established, resulting in the appoint-
ment of counsel and the provision of a free transcript of his trial for use on appeal. Scott's
indigent status at the time of his trial was assumed by the parties and the Illinois courts
for purposes of this case. Scott v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 1163 n.1 (1979).
2. Scott was charged with the theft of a sample case and address book totaling
$13.68 from F.W. Woolworth. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Scott v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158
(1979).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1(a)(1) (1969). The penalty provision of the statute
reads in relevant part:
A person first convicted of theft of property not from the person and not exceeding
$150 in value shall be fined not to exceed $500 or imprisoned in a penal institution
other than the penitentiary not to exceed one year, or both. A person convicted of
such theft a second or subsequent time, or after a prior conviction of any type of
theft, shall be imprisoned.in the penitentiary from one to 5 years.
Id See 99 S. Ct. at 1159 n.2.
4. See Brief for Petitioner at 5. Scott also alleged that because he had been de-
prived of the assistance of counsel at trial, the benefit of the other sixth amendment
rights to which he was entitled had been lost. Id. at 19. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426
U.S. 637 (1976) (right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation); Washing-
ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process of witnesses); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confrontation); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941)
(right to be advised of the elements of and the penalty for the offense being charged).
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Before an Illinois appellate court, Scott contended that under the
rule of Argersinger v. Hamlin,5 the sixth amendment" guaranteed him
the right to appointed counsel, even though he was only punished by a
fine, because the offense for which he was tried carried a potential
penalty of incarceration.7 Argersinger held that irrespective of the
denomination of a crime, no person could be imprisoned unless counsel
had been either appointed or properly waived.' Alternatively, Scott
argued that if Argersinger did not apply, its rule should be extended
to cover the trial of a person charged with a misdemeanor-theft since
such trials were "criminal prosecutions" within the intendment of the
sixth amendment.' The court determined that the sixth amendment
right to counsel extended only to those misdemeanants who are in fact
imprisoned, but did not guarantee appointed counsel to misdemeanor
defendants who, like Scott, do not suffer an actual loss of liberty."
After the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's deci-
sion,11 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari"2 to resolve
a conflict among state and lower federal courts regarding the proper
application of Argersinger.18
Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion,1' rejected Scott's
5. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In Argersinger, the Court decided whether the sixth amend-
ment right to the assistance of counsel depended upon the seriousness of the particular
criminal prosecution. This possibility was raised by the Court's decision in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held that a criminal defendant had no right to jury
trial unless charged with a crime carrying an authorized penalty of imprisonment in ex-
cess of six months. The State of Florida argued in Argersinger that the right to appointed
counsel should not be broader than the right to a jury trial, but conceded that where the
right to jury trial for serious offenses existed, the right to appointed counsel should also
be recognized. The Argersinger Court rejected the notion that the serious offense limita-
tion defined the scope of a criminal defendant's right to counsel, and did not distinguish
between serious and non-serious misdemeanors in applying the rule that without a know-
ing and intelligent waiver, no defendant could be imprisoned unless he was represented
by counsel at trial. See 407 U.S. at 37.
6. The sixth amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
7. See note 3 supra.
8. See note 5 supra.
9. Scott v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 1160 (1979).
10. People v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d 304, 343 N.E.2d 517 (1976).
11. People v. Scott, 68 Ill. 2d 269, 369 N.E.2d 881 (1977).
12. 98 S. Ct. 2817 (1978).
13. Scott v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 1159 & n.1 (1979). After Argersinger, the contro-
versy centered upon whether the lack of counsel vitiated the conviction itself, or simply
rendered any sentence of imprisonment unconstitutional. See also notes 85-88 and accom-
panying text infra.
14. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Powell joined the majority
opinion. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Blackmun also filed a dissenting
opinion.
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argument that Argersinger had left open the question of the unim-
prisoned misdemeanant's right to counsel."8 The Court pointed out that
the explicit purpose of Argersinger had been to prevent the states
from incarcerating uncounseled indigents. However, this was to occur
without disturbing the way in which the majority of misdemeanor
cases were handled."6 Furthermore, the Constitution did not require
state courts to appoint counsel to indigent defendants simply because
they were charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment
was an authorized penalty. 7 The Court noted that as contemplated by
the Framers of the Bill of Rights, the sixth amendment guaranteed on-
ly that an accused had the right in a criminal prosecution in a federal
court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense. 8 Eventually, the in-
dividual states had voluntarily adopted the practice of appointing
counsel to defend indigent criminal defendants under certain cir-
cumstances. Although state practice differed in the types of cases in
which counsel was supplied, this general endorsement of some policy of
assigning counsel persuaded the Court in Powell v. Alabama" that the
right to appointed counsel was fundamental and essential to the fair
trial of capital cases."
15. 99 S. Ct. at 1162. The majority did not respond to Scott's arguments that even if
a misdemeanor-theft prosecution was not a "criminal prosecution" within the intendment
of the sixth amendment, he still had the right to appointed counsel under the due process
clause, or alternatively, under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Scott contended that given the adversary climate of the criminal system, it was a denial
of due process to conduct a misdemeanor trial without the presence of defense counsel.
See Brief for Petitioner at 22-29. He further maintained that due process pertains not
only to life and liberty, but to property rights as well. Since a misdemeanor-theft convic-
tion subjected him to stigma, fine, and forfeiture of licenses and employment, Scott
argued that no distinction ' should be made between felonies and misdemeanors with
respect to the necessity of counsel to ensure a fair and accurate trial. Id at 42-47.
In his equal protection argument, Scott claimed that appointed counsel was required to
ensure indigents an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adver-
sary system. See Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404
U.S. 189, 197 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956). See also Petitioner's Brief
at 47-50.
16. 99 S. Ct. at 1160. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in Argersinger,
stated: "The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today's ruling. But in those that
end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will receive the benefit
of 'the guiding hand of counsel' so necessary where one's liberty is in jeopardy." 407 U.S.
at 40.
17. 99 S. Ct. at 1160.
18. Id See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27-30 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as BEANEY].
19. 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
20. 99 S. Ct. at 1160-61. The Powell Court did not create an absolute right to counsel
in capital cases, but focused on both the capital nature of the offense and the special dis-
advantages of the defendant. 287 U.S. at 71. Through dicta in subsequent non-capital
cases, the Powell rule was broadly interpreted so that the assistance of counsel became
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The Court then traced the evolution of the right to appointed
counsel to the imprisonment standard ultimately articulated in Argers-
inger.2 1 Justice Rehnquist noted that the right to appointed counsel
had developed without resort to the "serious offense" standard used to
delimit the sixth amendment right to jury trial in state courts.Y
Because the serious offense limitation is peculiar to the jury trial right,
the Court repeated the position previously taken in Argersinger that
the serious offense standard should not be used to shape the contours
of the right to appointed counsel.' The Court reasoned that constitu-
tional line drawing increased in difficulty as the reach of the Constitu- -
tion extended, and emphasized that the process of incorporation is not
aided by transposing limits from one area of sixth amendment juris-
prudence to another." The Court explained that differences between
federal and state law enforcement systems called for a less rigid ap-
plication of the federal constitutional principle to the states, particularly
since the range of human conduct regulated by state criminal laws is
much broader than that regulated by federal criminal laws.' This is
especially true in the area of conduct regulated by the states under
the label of "petty offenses." If the sixth amendment right to ap-
pointed counsel were extended to encompass the legion of petty of-
presumptively necessary when the case involved a capital crime. See Quicksall v. Michi-
gan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334
U.S. 672 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948). Finally, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 350 (1963), the Court expressly recognized the holding of Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961), as having settled the right to appointed counsel in all capital cases.
21. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court put forth the "special circum-
stances" rule to determine when counsel must be assigned in non-capital cases. In apply-
ing this rule, the discretion of the trial court was to be guided by notions of fundamental
fairness. The Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), later discarded the
Betts rule in favor of a categorical requirement that counsel be provided to all indigent
defendants charged with felonies. The last extension, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972), made the appointment of counsel in the trial of a non-felony offense a constitu-
tional imperative before a convicted defendant could be imprisoned.
22. 99 S. Ct. at 1161. The term "serious offense" has acquired a technical significance
derived from its use as a limitation on the right to jury trial. That right accrues to an ac-
cused who is charged with an offense having an authorized maximum penalty of more
than six months imprisonment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (the
authorized sentence is the measure of the seriousness of the offense, not the actual penal-
ty imposed). Thus, the seriousness of the offense is generally a legislative determination,
since it is the legislature's function to specify the maximum authorized penalties for com-
mission of the crime. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72-74 (1970). If, however, the
penalty has been left within the discretion of the court, such as in criminal contempt, the
seriousness of the offense is determined by the sentence actually imposed. See Frank v.
United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1969); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
23. 99 S. Ct. at 1161.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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fenses under state law, an intolerable burden of unpredictable dimen-
sion and magnitude would be imposed upon the states. Since decisional
law had already departed from the literal meaning of the sixth amend-
ment," the Court concluded that it was proper to consider the ramifica-
tions of Scott's proposed expansion of sixth amendment rights.
Moreover, the common law right to counsel as it existed prior to the
enactment of the sixth amendment did not provide a reliable basis for
determining the present limits of the right to appointed counsel, since
at common law, a person accused of a felony had less in the way of
right to counsel than a person accused of a misdemeanor.'
Absent a justification for extending the right to appointed counsel,
the Court returned to what it regarded as the central premise of
Argersinger-that actual imprisonment is a radically severe penalty
distinguishable from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment." Thus,
the Scott majority judged the rule of actual imprisonment to be
eminently sound and worth adopting as the line defining the constitu-
tional right to appointment of counsel."
In a concurring opinion,' Justice Powell reaffirmed his separate opin-
ion in Argersinger, stating that the Constitution did not require the
appointment of counsel in all cases where imprisonment is ultimately
imposed. He maintained that a "special circumstances"' approach
26. ld& This statement apparently refers to the expansion of what originally was a
right to employ counsel to the present status as a right to have counsel appointed. See
note 18 and accompanying text supra.
27. 99 S. Ct. at 1161-62. In Argersinger, the Court rejected this argument. As viewed
by the Argersinger Court, the sixth amendment cured this defect by extending the right
to counsel to felons without withdrawing the right to counsel in misdemeanor and petty
cases:
The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to counsel beyond its common-law
dimensions. But there is nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history, or
in the decisions of this Court, to indicate that it was intended to embody a retrac-
tion of the right in petty offenses wherein the common law previously did require
that counsel be provided.
407 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).
28. 99 S. Ct. at 1162. Although the express concern of the Argersinger Court was the
imprisonment sanction, this did not necessarily imply that there was no sixth amendment
right to appointed counsel where lesser sanctions were concerned. See Duke, The Right
to Appointed Counsek Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601, 607 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Duke].
29. 99 S. Ct. at 1162.
30. Id (Powell, J., concurring).
31. 407 U.S. 25, 44-66 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 64-65 (Powell, J., concurring). In Argersinger, Justice Powell stated that
there were three factors to consider in determining the indigent misdemeanant's right to
appointed counsel: (1) the complexity of the offense charged; (2) the probable sentence
upon conviction; and (3) the circumstances particular to the case, such as the competency
of the accused to present his own defense. Under this formula, the likelihood of imprison-
ment was not determinative. Counsel would be provided to those indigents who, if con-
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should be used to determine the misdemeanant's right to appointed
counsel in state courts.3 He repeated his dissatisfaction with the
Argersinger rule, since it compelled judges to discard the legislatively
authorized penalty of imprisonment on the basis of a pretrial con-
ference between the prosecution and judge. Despite his reservations,
Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court out of respect for stare
decisis, and expressed the hope that a more pliant rule would soon be
recognized as consistent with due process."
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented. 5
He first contended that the plain wording of the sixth amendment, as
well as prior decisions of the Court, compelled the conclusion that
Scott's uncounseled conviction violated the sixth and fourteenth
amendments." He noted that in Gideon v. Wainwright,7 the Court had
held the sixth amendment right to counsel in felony cases obligatory
on the states based on the premise that counsel's assistance was fun-
damental and essential to a fair trial. By establishing a categorical re-
quirement that counsel be appointed for indigent defendants charged
with felonies, Gideon abandoned the earlier special circumstances due
process analysis of Betts v. Brady., The Gideon result complemented
prior decisions which recognized that the meaningful exercise of pro-
cedural and substantive safeguards afforded criminal defendants de-
pended upon having "the guiding hand of counsel."'" Justice Brennan
victed, would receive a penalty similar in severity to a brief period of imprisonment. This
proposed "special circumstances" rule for misdemeanants resembles the rule applied to
felony cases by the Court in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (appointment of counsel in
non-capital state criminal cases required only when not to do so would result in a mani-
festly unfair trial). The Betts rule was ultimately overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment guarantee of counsel in felony cases is a fundamental
right that is obligatory on the states through the fourteenth amendment).
33. 99 S. Ct. at 1163 (Powell, J., concurring). The same criticisms of the "special cir-
cumstances" rule which plagued Betts would also exist if the rule were applied to misde-
meanor cases. Paradoxically, the rule required an unskilled layperson to demonstrate the
complexity of his case to the trial judge, then show why he was incompetent to manage
his own defense. A further criticism of the rule was its expectation that trial judges could
accurately predict whether or not events in the forthcoming trial would necessitate
defense counsel. Overall, the lack of a definite standard as to when counsel was required
fostered the unequal and haphazard treatment of indigent defendants. See Israel, Gideon
v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 211; Junker, The Right to
Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 709-10 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Junker]. See also Duke, supra note 28, at 609-12.
34. 99 S. Ct. at 1162-63 (Powell, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 1163 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See note 21 supra.
38. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). See notes 21 & 32 supra.
39. 99 S. Ct. at 1164 & nn.2 & 3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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claimed that even though Gideon involved a felony, its reasoning ex-
tended to "all criminal prosecutions." He noted that the fair trial ra-
tionale of Argersinger, like that of Gideon, suggested the eventual ap-
plication of the sixth amendment right to counsel to all state criminal
proceedings."0 As a cautious step in this logical progression, Arger-
singer held only that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed
counsel, even in petty offenses punishable by six months or less im-
prisonment, if it is likely that he will be incarcerated if convicted. The
question of the unimprisoned misdemeanant's right to counsel had
been explicitly reserved by the Argersinger Court."
Justice Brennan then maintained that Scott could prevail even if the
right to counsel were not extended beyond what was assumed to exist
in Argersinger, as neither party in that case questioned the right of
the accused to counsel in trials of non-petty offenses punishable by
more than six months in jail.42 Because Scott had not been charged
with a "petty" crime, but one punishable by a maximum sentence of
one year imprisonment, his right to appointed counsel was mandated
by the logic of Argersinger.41
Returning to Argersinger, Justice Brennan contended that the sole
question presented there had been whether the right to appointed
counsel applied to those petty offenses to which the right to jury trial
did not extend. In finding that the right did apply where imprisonment
resulted, the Argersinger Court reasoned that the right to counsel was
more fundamentally related to a fair trial than was the jury trial right,
and that the historical limitation to serious offenses particular to the
jury trial right had no relevance in determining when the right to
counsel existed. Justice Brennan argued that the rationale of Arger-
singer belied the majority's adoption of a standard for the right to
counsel more restrictive than the standard for granting the right to
jury trial." He maintained that Argersinger, properly interpreted,
40. I& at 1164-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. I& at 1165 & n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. I& at 1165 & n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See L. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUN-
SEL IN MISDEMEANOR COURT 11-12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HERMAN].
43. 99 S. Ct. at 1165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. l& at 1165-66. Justice Brennan referred to the following statement made by
Justice Powell in Argersinger:
It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is drawn, it must be drawn so
that an indigent has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is a due
process right to a jury trial. An unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in
a nonjury trial before a judge experienced in piecing together unassembled facts,
but before a jury the guiding hand of counsel is needed to marshall the evidence
into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of the defendant. If
there is no accompanying right to counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes mean-
ingless.
407 U.S. at 45-46 (Powell, J., concurring). But see id at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring), for
an opinion to the contrary.
1980
Duquesne Law Review
established a "two dimensional" test for the right to appointed counsel,
so that the right attached to any non-petty offense punishable by more
than six months imprisonment and to any petty offense where actual
incarceration was likely regardless of the maximum authorized
penalty. 5
Finally, Justice Brennan criticized the majority's adoption of the ac-
tual imprisonment standard to determine the misdemeanant's right to
counsel.'" The intolerable aspect of this method, he claimed, is that it
denies counsel to those defendants who are constitutionally entitled to
trial by jury. Justice Brennan insisted that the problems inherent in
the application of the actual imprisonment standard demonstrated the
superiority of the authorized imprisonment standard. He postulated
that the authorized imprisonment standard would more faithfully im-
plement the principles of Gideon. Since the imprisonment sanction is
particularly associated with criminal offenses, the trial of an imprison-
able offense possesses the characteristics of a criminal prosecution
found by Gideon to require the appointment of counsel.'8 The author-
ized penalty also more accurately predicted the stigma and other col-
lateral consequences of conviction; 9 and excepting Argersinger, author-
ized penalties had consistently guided the Court as the true measures
of the seriousness of offenses.
As further proof of the superiority of the authorized imprisonment
test, Justice Brennan pointed out that it created no problems of ad-
45. 99 S. Ct. at 1165-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Not only was Scott's misdemeanor-
theft a non-petty offense because it was punishable by a sentence of up to one year in jail,
but it also carried a clear moral stigma and was professionally prosecuted. Id. at 1166. See
also Duke, supra note 28, at 604-09.
46. 99 S. Ct. at 1166 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. The authorized imprisonment standard would require the appointment of
counsel for all indigents accused of a crime having a statutory penalty of imprisonment
for any length of time. To reduce the economic and personnel demands imposed by this
standard, certain offenses for which imprisonment is authorized could be regarded as
"quasi-criminal." Public welfare and regulatory offenses, such as housing code violations
and minor traffic violations, would not be treated as within the purview of the sixth
amendment according to the proponents of the authorized imprisonment standard. See S.
KRANTZ, C. SMITH, D. ROSSMAN, P. FROYD & J. HOFFMAN, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
CASES: THE MANDATE OF ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN 119-50 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RIGHT
TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES]; Rossman, The Scope of the Sixth Amendment: Who is a
Criminal Defendant?, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 633 (1975); Brief for Petitioner at 16, 37-40.
48. 99 S. Ct. at 1166-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1167. See also Note, Argersinger v. Hamlin and the Collateral Use of Prior
Misdemeanor Convictions of Indigents Unrepresented by Counsel at Trial, 35 OHIO ST.
L.J. 168 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Collateral Use], where the author discusses the con-
stitutional problems raised by the use of prior convictions for collateral purposes when
the prior conviction was obtained without the benefit of counsel.
50. 99 S. Ct. at 1167 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 22 supra.
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ministration since, unlike the actual imprisonment standard, it did not
require a case-by-case pretrial determination of the probable sentence
upon conviction.51 The authorized imprisonment test thus avoided the
equal protection and due process problems inherent in the predictive
evaluation method. Finally, the authorized imprisonment standard
merited adoption because it respected the legislative judgment of the
crime's gravity." Under it, the trial judge retained the permissible
sanction of imprisonment until after disclosure of the legal and factual
issues at trial.
Justice Brennan concluded his dissent by remarking that the major-
ity had improperly relied upon alleged economic burdens to the states
in adopting the actual imprisonment standard, concerns which were ir-
relevant and speculative. ' Citing previous decisions based upon the
equal protection clause,' he objected to the balancing by the Court of
the rights of the accused against the state's interest in its pocketbook.
Even if economic burdens were a proper consideration, they were not
present here, as several states had already adopted the practice of pro-
viding counsel in all cases where imprisonment was authorized, and
had done so without producing the dire results predicted by the major-
ity.' In summation, Justice Brennan characterized the majority deci-
sion as having capsized the reasoning of Argersinger. By restricting
the right to counsel more narrowly that the admittedly less fundamen-
tal right to jury trial, the Court had, in his opinion, made "an abrupt
break with its own well-considered precedents."5
51. 99 S. Ct. at 1167 (Brennan, J., dissenting). With this method, the trial judge and
the prosecution confer on the likelihood of imprisoning the accused if he is convicted. In
part, this decision is based upon the strength of the evidence against the accused. Thus,
before trial, the judge will have a biased view of the evidence and his decision regarding
the need for defense counsel will be influenced by the suggestive information supplied to
him by the prosecution. See RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 47, at
69-117; Duke, supra note 28, at 610-12; Junker, supra note 33, at 709-10. These various
commentators criticize the pretrial predictive evaluation method for its probable due pro-
cess and equal protection violations.
52. 99 S. Ct. at 1167 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As noted by Justice Brennan, these
potential equal protection and due process problems were initially suggested by Justice
Powell in Argersinger. See 407 U.S. at 52-55 (Powell, J., concurring). See also note 51
supra.
53. 99 S. Ct. at 1167 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1167-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1168 & n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
56. 99 S. Ct. at 1168 & n.18 (Brennan. J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further argued
that state legislatures could eliminate any undue expenses caused by the authorized
penalty standard by culling from the body of imprisonable offenses those which are not
truly criminal in nature. In his opinion, this reform was long overdue. Id. at 1170.
57. Id. at 1170. Justice Brennan compared Scott to Justice Black's description of
Betts v. Brady as "an anachronism when handed down." See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. at 345.
1980 315
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In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that the right to
counsel secured by the sixth and fourteenth amendments extended at
least as far as the right to jury trial secured by those amendments."
Therefore, an indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be af-
forded counsel when prosecuted for a non-petty offense, as well as
whenever the defendant is actually subjected to imprisonment upon
conviction.5 Using this two-fold analysis, Justice Blackmun concluded
that Scott's conviction should be reversed since he was convicted of an
offense for which he was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.0
The class of defendants for whom the Constitution requires the ap-
pointment of counsel in state criminal proceedings has expanded to in-
clude defendants in capital cases; defendants whose personal circum-
stances established them as incapable of conducting an adequate
defense;"' felony defendants" and defendants charged with misde-
meanors carrying a two year authorized penalty of imprisonment;" and
misdemeanants who are actually imprisoned." But the groundwork for
these decisions is divided. The extensions to capital defendants in
Powell v. Alabama" and to felony defendants in Gideon v. Wain-
wright 7 were based on a fundamental moral perception-that fairness
to individuals is a supreme value which warrants restraining govern-
ment in its disciplinary pursuits." This purist viewpoint was compro-
58. 99 S. Ct. at 1170 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1170-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1171 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
62. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). See notes 21 and 33 supra. See notes 69-72
and accompanying text infra.
63. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Gideon Court characterized the
right to appointed counsel as a fundamental right which was essential to a fair trial. The
sixth amendment right to counsel was, therefore, made obligatory on the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the Gideon Court spoke in
elaborate terms about the important role defense counsel played in obtaining a fair trial
for a defendant, the holding was subsequently construed as limited in application to
felonies. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
64. The two year rule derives from Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1963) (per
curiam), where the defendant was convicted of an offense labeled as a misdemeanor under
state law, but which carried a two year maximum term of imprisonment. The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of
[Gideon]." Id. Thus, the states cannot avoid the rule of Gideon by attaching a felony-
length imprisonment penalty to crimes bearing the name of "misdemeanor." See RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 47, at 128.
65. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See note 5 supra. See also notes 80-85
and accompanying text infra.
66. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See note 61 supra.
67. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See note 63 supra.
68. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 343-45; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 68-69.
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mised by the special circumstances rule fashioned by the Court in
Betts v. Brady on the basis of pragmatic concerns."' The Betts Court
considered it unwise to force the states into accepting a single mold of
criminal procedure patterned after the federal rule of providing coun-
sel to all indigent criminal defendants. 70 This deviation from principle
was justified by the notion that neither the state law enforcement sys-
tems nor the professional bar was equipped to handle a universal re-
quirement of counsel in serious criminal cases. It was also believed
that such a requirement would be so onerous that the states would
largely circumvent it anyway. 7' Therefore, the right to counsel in non-
capital cases was pinioned by the Betts Court on an empirical showing
that as the result of overreaching by the state's prosecutorial powers,
made possible by the absence of defense counsel, the individual defend-
ant had been denied due process. In Gideon v. Wainwright, this analy-
sis was rejected as unprincipled because the defendant's right to
counsel was dependent upon a judge's discretion as to when counsel
was necessary to ensure a fair trial, rather than upon an objective
standard of fairness. 2 The last extension of the right to counsel to im-
prisoned misdemeanants is a hybrid of these two decisional sources.
Although the Argersinger Court based its extension on the fair trial
rationale of Gideon,"' the politic Court in Scott elevated the state inter-
est in the prompt and vigorous administration of the criminal law to
dispositive significance and refused to recognize the applicability of
the fair trial principle beyond Argersinger's limits.74
Insofar as the decisions extending the right to appointed counsel did
so on the basis of the fair trial principle, they premised the necessity
of counsel to a fair trial on the pervasive importance of counsel's
defensive role in the adversary criminal trial process. The adversary
criminal system established in this country contrasts with the early
English system of judicial administration, which was designed to
assure the Crown of procedural advantages in order to defeat the dis-
order and lawlessness threatening its security.7' The sixth amendment,
however, was designed to protect criminal defendants from govern-
ment's oppressive use of its power in procuring the enforcement of its
69. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. at 473. See HERMAN, supra note 42, at 5-6; A. LEWIS,
GIDEON'S TRUMPET 221 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LEWIS].
70. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (counsel must be appointed in all
federal cases where the defendant is unable to procure the services of an attorney).
71. See HERMAN, supra note 42, at 5-6; LEWIS, supra note 69, at 221.
72. 372 U.S. at 345. See LEWIS, supra note 69, at 220.
73. 407 U.S. at 31-37.
74. 99 S. Ct. at 1162.
75. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 9-12 (1951) [hereinafter cited as HELLER]. See also BEANEY, supra note 18, at 8-14.
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laws. 6 Fundamental to cases involving the right to counsel is the
recognition that the adversary process, being essentially coercive, re-
quires the presence of counsel to achieve a parity between the state
and the individual.77 Because the criminal process is governed by the
esoteric and difficult science of law, it is unlikely that even a well-
educated layperson will have the adequate skill to combat the complex
forces bent on establishing his guilt and securing his punishment.
Thus, the right to appointed counsel became broader in scope, albeit in
a staggered fashion, because of the belief that a judgment acquired
through the mere artlessness of the defendant was repugnant to the
concept of justice.
If it is true that a just adjudication cannot be had without the pres-
ence of counsel, the inescapable conclusion which follows is that the
right to counsel's aid at trial should be an absolute right. Were the
question of full extension of the right to appointed counsel to be re-
solved purely from this conceptual standpoint, the answer should have
been obvious from the logical implications of the Powell opinion, or at
the latest, from the Gideon opinion." However, the Supreme Court has
been loathe to force upon the states the burden of implementing a full
right to appointed counsel, and this concern of federalism accounts for
the piecemeal progression of the right. Since Scott interprets Arger-
singer's actual imprisonment rule as the final stage in the development
of the right to appointed counsel, the former concern that a defendant
would be unfairly tried and convicted has transmogrified into a con-
cern that a defendant would be incarcerated as the result of an unfair
trial. Yet the Argersinger Court was heavily influenced by the abuses
of the misdemeanor trial process" where, for example, the guilt of the
defendant is generally assumed, prejudice reigns, the defendant's
rights are ridiculed, and the judges too frequently demean and malign
the defendant and the witnesses.8 As a result, the Argersinger Court
rejected the argument that the assistance of counsel was not necessary
to ensure that defendants accused of misdemeanors and petty crimes
receive a fair trial.2 But the Argersinger Court did not create an affir-
76. See HELLER, supra note 75, at 13-34.
77. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
78. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra. See generally HERMAN, note 42
supra.
79. See HERMAN, supra note 42, at 59-72, 84-86.
80. 407 U.S. at 34-36.
81. See generally L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1977); Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 26
(1973). See also HERMAN, supra note 42, at 11-30.
82. 407 U.S. at 36 (citing AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR
MISDEMEANANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1970)) ("misdemeanants represented by attor-
neys are five times as likely to emerge from police court with all charges dismissed as are
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mative right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases; it merely pro-
hibited the trial judge from imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon
an uncounseled misdemeanor defendant." The effect of this no confine-
ment rule was to skew the perspective of the earlier sixth amendment
cases by focusing only on the penalty aspect of the trial." Both Powell
and Gideon invalidated the conviction of an uncounseled defendant in
capital and felony cases, respectively. Although the Argersinger Court
made no explicit statement validating the uncounseled conviction of an
unimprisoned misdemeanant, the opinion was susceptible to this read-
ing and various lower courts upheld the constitutionality of convictions
defendants who face similar charges without counsel"). The Argersinger Court also found
that, with one exception, the application to the states of sixth amendment rights had not
been limited on the basis that the offense charged was not serious. Cf. Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) (right to an impartial jury); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process of witnesses); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(right to confrontation); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial). The single
instance where the Court has limited an enumerated sixth amendment right on the basis
of the seriousness of the offense concerned the right to trial by jury. See Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
83. This has been described as the "negative" right to counsel, since it affords the
indigent misdemeanant the "right" not to go to jail unless counsel had been appointed or
properly waived. See Collateral Use, supra note 49, at 169-70.
84. The Argersinger Court refused to distinguish between serious and non-serious
offenses in defining the scope of the right to counsel because there was no support for
qualifying the sixth amendment language, which clearly states that "in all criminal prose-
cutions" the enumerated rights shall apply. See note 27 supra. Despite this reasoning, the
Argersinger Court compromised the plain meaning of these words by using an imprison-
ment/non-imprisonment dichotomy, which is no more principled than the serious/non-
serious offense dichotomy rejected by the Court. See HERMAN, supra note 42, at 83. An
analogy can be drawn, however, between the fragmentation of the sixth amendment's
meaning for the rights to jury trial and counsel. The serious offense limitation of the jury
trial right derives from an historical reason rather than from textual analysis, and in the
case of this right, the meaning of the "criminal prosecutions" language has been varied on
grounds extrinsic to the text of the amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). The Court's analysis in Scott provided a justification founded upon administrative
considerations which allow the words "all criminal prosecutions" to mean something less
than what they seem to mean when speaking of the right to counsel. See notes 24-26 and
accompanying text supra. The practical problems which would beset a complete extension
of the right to appointed counsel are comparable to the historical considerations which in-
fluenced the Duncan Court to place limits upon the jury trial right. Just as the right to
jury trial is limited to non-petty offenses although no such restriction appears in the text
of the amendment, so too the right to appointed counsel is now limited to cases involving
actual imprisonment, although no distinction between imprisonment and non-
imprisonment is present in the text of the amendment itself. However, not all authorities
equate the impact of economic concerns on the sixth amendment with the impact of
historical limits. See, e.g., RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 47, at 121-22;
Junker, supra note 33, at 706-07; Collateral Use, supra note 49, at 185 & n.77.
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obtained without counsel provided that no imprisonment was imposed.6
Scott now upholds the constitutional validity of the uncounseled con-
viction, much to the chagrin of commentators who viewed this outcome
as fraught with illogic." Doubts about the soundness of the no confine-
ment rule stem from the quandry of how an unconstitutional result, im-
prisonment, can flow from a constitutionally intact proceeding. The
Scott decision in effect sanctions a sliding scale of due process for mis-
demeanor trials. In an uncounseled trial, the kind of sentence ulti-
mately imposed now determines whether or not the trial itself reached
a constitutionally acceptable level of fairness and veracity of adjudica-
tion.87 If at the end of the trial the defendant is incarcerated, the pres-
ence of counsel is retroactively deemed necessary to ensure that the
trial was a fair proceeding which resulted in accurate findings. How-
ever, if the accused is merely fined, the services of defense counsel are
not deemed essential and the requirements of due process are com-
plete.88
The apprehensions which militated against a full extension of the
right to appointed counsel at the time of Argersinger similarly de-
85. See, e.g., United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Sawaya, 486 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1973); Marston v. Oliver, 485 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1973);
Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1972). Contra, Potts v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450
(5th Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Savage, 513 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1975); James v. Headley, 410 F.2d
325 (5th Cir. 1969); Morgan v. State, 235 Ga. 632, 221 S.E.2d 47 (1975); Ex parte Burt, 499
S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State ex reL Winnie v. Harris, 75 Wis.2d 547, 249
N.W.2d 791 (1977).
86. See, e.g., HERMAN, note 42 supra; Duke, note 28 supra; Junker, note 33 supra;
Collateral Use, supra note 49, at 173-75, 188-89.
87. See Collateral Use, supra note 49, at 173-75.
88. After Scott, a prominent question is what collateral civil and criminal conse-
quences can be based upon uncounseled convictions. Since Scott upholds the uncounseled
conviction, it can be used to support the direct and collateral imposition of less drastic
consequences such as fine, stigma, probation, loss of employment, and revocation of
licenses. However, more serious constitutional problems are raised when an uncounseled
conviction is used collaterally as the basis for imprisonment. For example, under a penalty
enhancement scheme or recidivist statute, an uncounseled prior conviction could influence
the sentencing portion of a later counseled conviction so that imprisonment would result.
The uncounseled conviction could also be considered in a subsequent proceeding to revoke
parole, probation or a suspended sentence. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on
permissible collateral uses of uncounseled convictions, Argersinger implies that subse-
quent imprisonment is prohibited since no uncounseled conviction may "end up in the ac-
tual deprivation of a person's liberty." 407 U.S. at 40. See also Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.
109, 115 (1967) (felony convictions obtained in violation of the Gideon rule cannot be used
to support or enhance punishment for another offense). See generally Collateral Use, note
49 supra. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide this issue in Baldasar
v. Illinois, 52 Ill. App. 3d 305, 367 N.E.2d 459 (1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1495 (1979)
(No. 77-6219) (issue is whether prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction can be con-
sidered so as to elevate a subsequent misdemeanor offense to felony status, thereby
augmenting the possible penalty upon conviction).
Recent Decisions
terred the Scott Court from progressing beyond the no confinement
rule. On neither occasion did the Court question the constitutional rele-
vance of the administrative burdens which a full extension of the right
to appointed counsel might place upon state courts." The Court will-
ingly accepted the notion that an absolute extension of the right to
counsel would impose an undue burden on the states, despite the lack
of any accurate figures on the potential misdemeanor caseload, the
number of non-felony indigent defendants, or the current availability of
and prospective need for defense attorneys." Furthermore, in Scott
and Argersinger, the Court accepted the propriety of compromising in-
dividual rights on the basis of the maladministration of case disposition
and the unselectivity of case intake which are at least partly responsi-
ble for the clogged misdemeanor court system.91 The failure of the
Court to insist upon radical reform in the misdemeanor system has
allowed the states to bootstrap themselves into denying the right to
counsel to unimprisoned indigent misdemeanants because of the states'
own poor allocation of judicial and prosecutorial resources.'
The Scott Court was also influenced by seven years of experience in
implementing the no confinement rule.93 In Argersinger, the Court at-
tempted to stimulate adversariness in the misdemeanor process by
providing counsel to imprisoned indigent misdemeanants. ' Ideally,
defense counsel's purpose is to demand the scrupulous treatment of his
client by the criminal justice system, to ensure that the whole of his
case is dissected into separately analyzable parts for exposition at
trial, and essentially, to be a gadfly to the prosecution.95 Ironically,
various studies relied upon by the Scott Court demonstrated that no
discernible adversary spirit had been fostered by the Argersinger rule
that counsel be appointed whenever imprisonment upon conviction was
a realistic possibility." An obsession for the speedy and frugal dispos-
89. But see text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
90. See HERMAN, supra note 42, at 59-72; RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra
note 47, at 9-18.
91. See HERMAN, supra note 42, at 65.
92. Id.
93. 99 S. Ct. at 1162 & n.5.
94. 407 U.S. at 36-37.
95. See Ingraham, The Impact of Argersinger-One Year Later, 8 L. & Soc'Y REV.
615, 635-36 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ingraham).
96. 99 S. Ct. at 1162 n.5. See RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 47, at
4-5, where the authors state:
Certain general findings that have emerged from this and other studies can be sum-
marized as follows:
- Although most jurisdictions have begun to appoint counsel in non-felony cases
where imprisonment may be imposed (some jurisdictions, in fact, had done so even
before Argersinger) compliance has been generally token in nature. What this
means is that: (a) waiver of counsel remains common and is often openly encouraged
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ing of cases, regardless of the fairness or truth of the result, still pre-
vailed. A conciliatory rather than contestual relationship between
opposing counsel remained the norm. In most cases, a guilty plea and
diminished sentence were agreed upon out of court after private nego-
tiations between prosecuting and defending counsel, both of whom
usually regarded the misdemeanor case as a relatively insignificant
item on their busy schedules. 7 Thus, simply mandating that lawyers
represent indigent misdemeanants did little to rectify the habitual -
negligence of the misdemeanor court, and according to some observers,
even intensified its assembly-line atmosphere." These results demon-
strate the natural resistance which a theory of justice may encounter
when competing against a solidly entrenched organization of criminal
administration." But even more importantly, these results undermined
the belief that the fair trial principle could be applied to misdemeanor
cases. Because the basic policies underlying the Argersinger extension
were not effectuated by compliance with its mandate, the Scott Court
perceived that nothing would be accomplished by extending the right
to counsel beyond the requirements of Argersinger.
by judges; (b) indigency standards nationally are disparate and irrational and have
not been uniformly applied; (c) appointed counsel is often inexperienced or of
limited competence; (d) counsel often is appointed just before or at trial; (e) counsel
often is not adequately prepared to represent his client's best interest; (f) limited
concern with basic procedural fairness continues to be prevalent in lower criminal
courts; and (g) relatively little attention is given to the dispositional needs of
defendants.
97. See, e.g., Ingraham, note 95 supra, where the author explains that:
[D]efense counsel, be he appointed private counsel or public defender, is a member
of a system which has systemic needs and demands which it enforces on its mem-
bers through various forms of subtle, and not so subtle, pressures and sanctions. It
may be presumed that in most cases defense lawyers desire to protect their clients,
but the pressures imposed upon them by their own busy schedules and by the
courts demanding the speedy disposition of cases may be sufficient to override a
full-hearted commitment to exercise every fair and legal device at their disposal to
improve the position of their clients.
Id. at 638 (footnote omitted). See also Blumberg, Covert Contingencies in the Right to
Assistance of Counsel, 20 VAND. L. REV. 581 (1967); Junker, supra note 33, at 697-703;
Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
98. See, e.g., Ingraham, note 95 supra, where the author reports:
All of these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of Arger-
singer has not been to increase the amount of adversariness within the system but
merely to increase the need for defense attorneys to process the defendant through
the system in an expeditious way. Thus, Argersinger may have the effect of delay-
ing the proceedings, of increasing the legal costs of such proceedings, and of
routinizing procedures for handling misdemeanor cases, but it does not appear that
it is having much effect in changing the nature of the process from one of negotia-
tion to one of adjudication.
Id. at 634-35. See also RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 47, at 3-7.
99. See Ingraham, supra note 95, at 637-38.
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However, the basic assumption of the fair trial principle is that the
presence of counsel serves to protect the defendant from the charac-
teristic abuses of the misdemeanor court, including those that fall
short of an unfair loss of liberty.1® It may be that counsel's presence
will not guarantee the misdemeanor defendant fairness in every aspect
of his trial; and that, apart from preserving the option of imprisoning
counseled misdemeanants, the appointing of counsel has only a slight
effect upon the manner in which misdemeanor defendants are treated.
If, indeed, the counseled defendant is in substantially the same predica-
ment as the uncounseled defendant in terms of obtaining a trial which
is for the most part fair, then it is tempting to conclude that the
assistance of counsel is not essential to obtaining one. This conclusion,
however, confuses the right to representation with the effectiveness of
representation.
The concern over the effectiveness of representation may explain
the Scott Court's focusing upon the penalty aspect of the misdemeanor
trial, since presumably the Court sought to provide a benefit to un-
counseled misdemeanor defendants commensurate with that of appoint-
ing counsel. Since the observable effect of affording counsel to the
misdemeanant is generally a sentence reduction,' thl Court gave to
uncounseled indigents what it perceived as the equivalent: removal of
the penalty of imprisonment. By eliminating the imprisonment sanc-
tion, the Court provided uncounseled misdemeanants with the manifest
practical benefit of counsel. Apparently the Court considered the use
of the predictive evaluation as a surrogate plea bargain advantageous
because it was not necessary to hire another person to do what the
prosecutor and judge could do themselves."'2
The array of functions performed by the lawyer for a criminal
defendant, however, is not reducible to a simple prohibition on im-
prisoning the unrepresented misdemeanant. To do so minimizes the
vital role counsel plays in other areas, such as pretrial release and
bond-setting, attacking the constitutionality of laws and law enforce-
ment techniques, determining the sufficiency of the charge, presenting
and suppressing evidence, selecting and examining witnesses, raising
protective motions, and ensuring the meaningful exercise of the other
100. See notes 80 & 81 supra.
101. See HERMAN, supra note 42, at 24; RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra
note 47, at 218-20; Ingraham, supra note 95, at 634-38. See also Note, The Unconstitu-
tionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1397-98 (1970), where it is suggested
that plea bargaining methods thwart the basic values sought to be preserved by the
criminal trial process.
102. But see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 61, where the Court denied that a trial
judge could fairly represent the interests of the defendant while concurrently performing
his duties on the bench.
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sixth amendment rights.' Some observers of the misdemeanor system
insist that reform will not occur until enough lawyers populate its
courtrooms and publicize its abuses.' Moreover, while many lawyers
do not regard the misdemeanor defendant with the depth of concern
usually reserved for defendants charged with felony and capital
crimes, the fact remains that even the perfunctory lawyer will under-
stand and invoke legal procedures more competently than will an un-
counseled misdemeanor defendant.10 5
In view of this, the right to counsel, which has often been described
as the most pervasive right,0 is paradoxically less broad in scope than
the other sixth amendment rights."'1 For example, the defendant has
the right to jury trial if charged with an offense carrying a maximum
authorized confinement in excess of six months."8 In certain situations,
however, Scott will deny the right to counsel to indigent misdemean-
ants who have an absolute right to a jury trial. The absence of counsel
in most of these cases will result in the unwitting release of the jury
trial right by an intimidated defendant 1" or the appointment of counsel
by a conscientious judge once the defendant exercises his right to a
jury trial. But there will be situations where an uncounseled misde-
103. See HERMAN, supra note 42, at 16-30.
104. Id at 28-29.
105. Id. at 20.
106. Id. at 68.
107. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
108. See note 22 supra.
109. The following excerpt from the Report of the Trial Proceedings for Scott's mis-
demeanor-theft conviction illustrates the modern-day adage that an uncounseled mis-
demeanant and his rights are soon parted:
The Court: Who are you?
Mr. Scott: Scott.
The Court. You are charged with the offense of theft.
Mr. Scott: Well, your Honor, that isn't true.
The Court: I said you are charged with it. My next inquiry is are you going to be
ready for trial?
Mr. Scott: Am I ready?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Scott: I am ready for trial.
The Court: Is the state ready?
Mr. Grossman: State is ready.
The Court: Arraign the defendant, please.
The Clerk: You are charged with the offense of theft. Are you ready for trial?
Mr. Scott: Yes, I am.
The Clerk: How do you plead to the charges?
Mr. Scott: Not guilty.
The Clerk: Do you want to be tried by this Court or before a jury?
Mr. Scott: Well, it doesn't matter. Right here will be okay with me.
Appendix to Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 22a, Scott v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979).
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meanant demands a jury trial despite his incompetence to discern the
law and marshall the evidence for the contemplation of his peers. If
the purpose of the decision to give the defendant the right to a jury
trial in serious cases was to provide him with a "defense against arbi-
trary law enforcement,""' its meaning has been nullified by Scott's
refusal to give the defendant the right to counsel.
Patricia T. Galvin
110. As stated in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968):
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against
the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-
sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction
of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the
Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise
of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty
of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so
typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression
in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the deter-
mination of guilt or innocence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of
jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement
qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and must therefore be respected by the States.

